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A major topic in the writings of Manasseh of llya is that of knowledge, 
to which he devoted at least forty chapters in both parts of 'AIRi! Menas-
seh.1 He classifies knowledge in a variety of ways, from a variety of points 
of view, the final aim of which is to disseminate among his coreligionists 
an awareness of the new knowledge that has been accumulating in the 
world, and the necessity of acquiring it for the sake of making life easier. 
safer. and richer. 
He first classifies knowledge according to its two sources, the senses 
and reason. He describes knowledge solely derived from the senses as par-
ticular and perforce limited in scope. Indeed, were the senses the only 
source of knowledge, man could never have raised himself above the ani-
mal stage. The senses are essential as "tools" of reason, but it is reason that 
transforms the particular data obtained through the senses into universals 
and thus organizes man's world. As for the function of reason, Manasseh 
emphasizes above all its subsumptive quality, i.e., its striving for ever more 
embracing concepts, and considers its progress in terms of expanding gen-
eralizations. 2 
Reflecting the prevalent view among scholars of the 17th and 18th cen-
turies, Manasseh considered mathematics the highest expression of ra-
tional knowledge. "All its ways," he wrote, "are demonstrative, following 
only one method, which certainly is the clear truth.~ On the other hand, 
he was critical of those who sought mathematical certainty in areas which 
do not yield to its methods, and who were of the opinion that, .. since there 
I. A/pr M.-nasseh (henccfonh AM) (Wilno, 1822), chaps. 24-57; A/pr MenaSleh. 11. 
(Wilno, 1904),chaps. 1.2.16.17.11!. 
2. AM. chaps. 24. 49. 73, 175; 11. ch. 2. 
3. AM. II. chaps. 2. 16, 17. pp. 15, 27. 29. and more. 
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was no clear rational knowledge outside of mathematics . . . human be-
havior must perforce be based on mere fantasy and conjecture." Such a 
view, he writes, '"confuses and destroys the orderly state of the world" (ch. 
21, p. 31). 
Of a lower order and only indirectly derived from either source are two 
additional kinds of knowledge which Manasseh groups under the collec-
tive title of mequbbalot. • He calls the first narrative knowledg~ and the 
second-imitative knowledge.6 He defines the first as knowledge one ar-
rives at 
neither by the senses, nor by reason. but by hearing about it from a friend 
or friends . . • Although the original transmitter perforce obtained that 
knowledge either by his senses or by his reason, there exists in this kind of 
knowledge, in addition to the fear of error. also the fear of falsehood, i.e .• 
lest for some anticipated gain /the transmitter{ might have lied. The longer 
the chain of transmitters, the greater the fear of both error and falsehood 
(ch. 25, p. IOa). 
Regrettably Manasseh did not elaborate, nor did he give any example of 
this kind of knowledge. It stands to reason that he was referring to histor-
ical knowledge, and one wonders whether he would also include in it the 
Biblical narrative (Sec Barzilay, 1974, pp. 173-175). 
Manasseh defines .. imitative" knowledge as .. a kind of narrative knowl-
edge, but inferior to it (ch. 28, p. !Ob). One docs not obtain it by transmis-
sion, but by observing the behavior of one's fellow men and imitating that 
behavior. Critically he comments, however, that what may be good for 
some people and in accordance with their interest and temperament must 
not necessarily be so for other people. He therefore thinks that this son of 
knowledge should not be considered knowledge at all. Regrettably, how-
ever, it constitutes the basis for the behavior and opinions of most people, 
and whoever does not conform to it is considered an ignoramus and a 
fool.' 
There also are other classifications of knowledge or "wisdom" in the 
writings of Manasseh. According to one, it is divided into theoretical and 
practical," and according to another, into human and divine.• While the 
4. Transmitted Knowledge. 
s. 5ippuri1. AM. ch. 2S. p. 10. 
6. :no1'o CMlllll mTD, AM., ch. 28. pp. 10-11. 
7. AM. ch. 28. p. IOb; AM. II. ch. 18. pp. 29-30. 
8. ·ln•unit umll'asi1: AM. chaps 37. 38. 39. p. IJb. 
9. hul(mot 'enosi_vyot vrhul{mQt h4ttimih min hailama im. AM. chaps. 78 (p. 27bl. 173 
(pp. 68-69). 
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first represents a secular and general point of view, the second represents 
a religious and specifically Jewish point of view. separating mundane and 
transcendental knowledge. Neither of these classifications is original, and 
both are frequently ecountered in the writings of the Berlin maski/im. 
Manasseh defines theoretical knowledge as constituting a goal in itself. 
He includes in it experiences of both an aesthetic and an intellectual na-
ture. On the other hand, he defines practical knowledge as the mastery of 
a trade or a business for the purpose of gaining a livelihood. Such knowl-
edge serves no purpose in itself, but is a mere preparation for the attain-
ment of the true and real goal, the actualization of reason. 10 
Of greater importance and consequence in Manasseh's thought is his 
division of knowledge into .. human" and .. divine." Though he, no doubt, 
was indebted for this classification to Wessely's Words of Peace and Truth 
( 1782), in which the poet-laureate of the Berlin Haskalah drew a demar-
cation line between the Teaching of God and the Teaching of Man,'' urg-
ing his coreligionists to embrace both, Manasseh worked out this division 
in his own original way, thereby avoiding some of the pitfalls of Wessely's 
formulation, which could have been disastrous for him in the Lithuanian 
milieu of the time. 
What is interesting in this division of knowledge into human and divine 
is the relationship Manasseh seeks to establish between the two, expressing 
some original thoughts about the possible role of Judaism in the modern 
world and its unique function in a culture of a predominantly scientific 
character. On the one hand he separates the two, but on the other hand, 
he desires to bring them into close cooperation with each other, which in 
his view is essential for the good of mankind as a whole. He extols the 
divine teachings of the Torah as superior by far to secular learning, com-
paring the Torah to the soul which acts and leads, and human learning to 
the body which is led and acted upon. 12 He further asserts that the divine 
Torah prepares man for eternal life, whereas secular knowledge only im-
proves his temporal, mundane lot. On the other hand, he subjugates the 
Torah to secular knowledge and assigns to it a role that is merely prepa-
ratory. Before further clarifying this apparent dualism, we must briefly de-
scribe Manasseh's view of human knowledge. 
10. AM. chaps. 37-39. p. I Jb. This division of knowledgee is frequently referred to in the 
writings of Yi~haq Satanow (1732-1805). one of the most able and prolific writers of the 
Berlin Haskalah. Cf. his Mil~ ·,.foip. I ( 1789. ch. 28); Huie/( ttimim ( 1795. ch. 4); Dil?re Rihut 
( 11100. p. 13). As fort he place and year of the publication of Dif!ri> Rif!ut. see Klausner (1930. 
p. 149. n. 4). 
11. TUrat Hallem Vl'l<lral ha addm. 
12. AM. chaps. 78, 181 (p. 76), AM. II. ch. 16. pp. 25-28. 
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He divides it into three categories: I) mathematical-technological. u 2) 
natural.•• and 3) divine-volitional.'~ He is quite clear and convincing about 
the first two, but his formulation of the third one-though not the idea 
itself-is somewhat hazy. He explains the combined title of the first cate-
gory as follows: 
Limmiu.iiJ·_1•01 /mathematics/ deals with ... arithmetic and geometry. It 
is also called melakutitl technological/, because through it tools for all 
kinds of crafts are produced.•• 
Manasseh, no doubt, was aware that the role of mathematics was by far 
greater than its functional use in technology; however, in line with the util-
itarian approach of the 18th century, he put the greatest stress on its prac-
tical application. 
Clearly defined and elaborated at great length is the second category, 
that of natural knowledge. It is a major theme in his writings, to which he 
returns again and again. Thus, in the opening chapter of 'Al1ie Menasseh, 
II. he describes that category as follows: 
The Creator, blessed be He. prepared inside the earth and upon its sur-
face ... several kinds of soil. sand and clay, various metals and many 
kinds of stones, from the precious to the plain. which are used for the con-
struction of walls. They are abundant and unclaimed. only awaiting to be 
extracted by a knowledge of their properties. Among the vegetable species. 
there also are some that grow by themselves and may be picked up by any-
one. _It is only necessary to know how to mix and prepare them. so that they 
may be used for both food and medicine. This is also true with respect to 
some seeds which are sown for food ... From some of them. and by only 
a small investment, great benefits may be derived . . . It is thus obvious 
that man must direct his main effort toward the acquisition of a great 
amount of necessary knowledge. a task which requires much thought and 
diligence." 
In another passage. he is even more specific, stressing both the abundance 
of nature and the importance of mathematics and natural science for its 
exploitation for the benefit of man.•• 
Most interesting are Manasseh's views on the third category of know!· 
edge. which, strangely enough, he termed both "divine" and .. volitional. .. 
I J. limmudfryith·m<'lill(utir. 
14. 11/rfryi. 
15. ·.,tt;hi-rt'sim1n·i. 
In. AM. II. ch. 16. p. 26. 
17. AM. 11. ch. I. p. 14. 
IX. //>11.J .• ch. lb, pp. :?ti-27. 
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He offers two explanations for the term .. divine": the first, because this 
category deals with man, whose composition of body and soul is divine; 
the second. because in Hebrew the term .. elohi" (divine) connotes leader-
ship and rule, qualities again associated with man (ch. 79). The term 
.. volitional" (resoniyyi), he further points out, also indicates that this cat-
egory deals with men, each one of whom has a will of his own, with his 
own proclivities and ambitions, needs and desires, and it requires great 
wisdom and strength to reconcile them, and to lead and govern them. 19 
The somewhat awkward description of this category notwithstanding, 
Manasseh's conception of it and the connection he seeks to establish be-
tween it and the other categories is quite obvious. Following his praises for 
mathematics and natural sciences, he poses the question how best to apply 
them for the improvement of man's lot in the world. However, before an-
swering it. he feels obligated to justify his preoccupation with this problem 
in the first place. If man's supreme goal has been declared to be the concern 
with the fate of his soul20-why bother at all with the transient and trivial 
affairs of the body? In reply, Manasseh draws a parallel between the rela-
tionship of God and the universe, on the one hand, and between the soul 
and the body, on the other hand. Just as God, the soul of the universe, 
.. wishes" the universal body to function properly, so too does the human 
soul desire proper function from .. its" body.21 Indeed, the connection be-
tween body and soul being an integral one, the contemplative task of the 
soul, for the sake of attaining its higher goal, cannot be achieved unless the 
well-being of the body is first assured. In short, the mundane happiness of 
man is a prerequisite for the achievement of his higher, spiritual happi-
ness.12 Having thus asserted his alleged loyalty to the higher transcendental 
ideal, Manasseh now feels free to leave that subject, and, returning to mun-
dane affairs, he offers his views on the improvement of society. As seen, he 
was convinced that the Creator amply provided nature with "raw mate-
rials" to satisfy all of man's needs and pleasures. Moreover, he also was 
convinced that the developments in mathematics, the sciences, and tech-
nology had reached a level unprecedented in the history of man ... It is quite 
possible, .. he wrote, .. that all necessary knowledge had already been at-
tained ... However, it is the low moral state of man that prevents that 
knowledge from becoming universally diffused and turned into a tool for 
the general good. The disagreements and contentions among people, stem-
19. /hid .• ch. !12. pp. 28-29: II. ch. 16. pp. 26-27. 
20. AM. ch. 73, p. 24a: AM II. ch. 26. pp. 36-37. 
21. Samma dehayyr. in Raisin ( 1923. p. 206). Sec also AM. ch. 136, p. 53. 
22. AM. ch. 136, p. 53b: AM. II ch. 16. p. 26, ch. 26. p. 37; Manasseh ( 1823, p. 3b). 
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ming from their opposite views and desires, block cooperation and impede 
progress. Knowledge already accumulated cannot become functional un-
less men would first learn to reconcile their differences and to become so-
cially aware and responsive. Manasseh thus believes that the trouble of 
humanity lies primarily in the gap between its intellectual and ethical de-
velopments and that that gap would not close before greater cooperation 
and humanitarianism would prevail in the world. For the attainment of 
this goal, however, he thinks that there is no better instrument than the 
Torah, all of whose commandments prepare man for the adoption of the 
great principle of Hillel: .. What is hateful unto thee. you should not do 
unto your friend. "'2J 
All the positive and negative commandments. the non-rational (auditory)"' 
and the rational. as well as the Biblical narrations ... improve men's 
morals and ensure harmony among them, thus preparing them in no small 
measure to reach the heights of knowledge in mathematics and natural sci~ 
ence. through which all the needs of men can be satisfied." 
In view of the above, the essence of the third category of knowledge 
has finally been elucidated and defined. hs subject is none other than the 
Torah, conceived of as the reconciler of differences. the harmonizer of op-
posing tendencies, and the moral guide of man. In the final stage of his 
speculation, Manasseh thus merges the two divisions of knowledge, the 
human and the divine, harnessing them both to the supreme task of im-
proving society and man's earthly lot. 
By interpreting science in utilitarian-functional terms alone and Torah 
in ethical-educational terms alone, steering clear of the mutually exclusive 
philosophies underlying these two so widely-separate cultural domains, 
Manasseh not only legalized the pursuit of secular studies by Jews, but 
placed those studies in one framework with Torah. Furthermore, within 
that framework he placed Torah in a rather subservient position to science 
and mathematics, defining its role as that of the moral educator of man for 
the sake of his material advancement by the aid of scientific knowledge. It 
is thus noteworthy that while Manasseh was critical of the medieval Jewish 
thinkers for subjecting the Torah to philosophy, 26 he himself seems to have 
done much the same, though, of course, in the framework of modern sci-
23. T. B. Shab. 31 a. 
24. n,.llOW 
25. AM.11.ch.16.27;seealsoAM.ch. l81.p. 76bandmorc. 
26. Manasseh ( 1807. p. 101. 
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ence. No doubt aware of this, he offers two explanations to reassert the 
superiority of Torah over secular knowledge. He writes: 
Although the Torah is only a preparation for the essential knowledge" of 
natural science and mathematics, it is deeper, wider and more embracing 
than (the e:<panse) of the eanh. In opposition to science, which deals with 
fi:<ed and constant things. the Torah deals with man and his constantly 
changing views. which are the result of the changing times and conditions. 
Besides. there actually are two aspects of Torah, one external, the other 
internal. It is only the first that has been put at the service of mundane 
goals, to help improve man's lot on earth: the latter, however, remains 
reserved. for the much superior task of preparing the soul for its eternal 
bliss.:• 
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